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THINKING ABOUT THE STATE:
LAW REFORM AND THE CROWN
IN CANADA
BY DAVID COHEN*
In August 1985, the Law Reform Commission of Canada released a working paper
entitled "The Legal Status of the FederalAdministration." The working paper calls
for a re-examinationof the concept of the federal Crown in Canadian law. In this
article,ProfessorCohen undertakesa criticalexaminationofthefocusandmethodology
ofthe Commission'swork ProfessorCohen commends the Commissionfor its excursion
into the field of law reform and the state but points out that this working paper
representsan incomplete andflawed treatmentof the subject In light of this; Professor
Cohen proceeds to describe and evaluate what in his view are the more significant
ideas involved in the study of law reform and the state

I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1985, the Law Reform Commission of Canada released
a working paper, ambiguously entitled "The Legal Status of the Federal
Administration."' The paper purports to lay the foundation for the most
radical transformation in Canadian administrative regulation since
Diceyian concepts of the Rule of Law were applied to disputes between
bureaucrats and individuals during the late nineteenth century. In reality
it calls, albeit tentatively, for a re-examination of the concept of the
federal Crown in Canadian law and the recognition of a unitary federal
administration. At this preliminary stage the Commission suggests the
establishment of a special regime of law that would be applied to define
the relationship of individuals and the Canadian state.

o Copyright, 1986, David Cohen.
* Visiting Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.

Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Legal Status of the FederalAdministration (Working
Paper No. 40) (Ottawa: The Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985) [hereinafter Working
Paper]. The reasons for the current federal interest in the legal status of the federal administration
are unremarkable. Certainly reform can be justified on narrow grounds - the patriation of the
Constitution and the concomitant need of the state to "formalize its special pre-eminence"; internal
inconsistencies in the law; and clarification of the law (at 1-4). These are not, however, the most
pressing reasons for activity in this area. Rather, reform is demanded by the dangers to liberty
and self-government associated with bureaucratic and majoritarian power, by the inadequacies of
the current legal review processes, and by the failure of judges to recognize the benefit-defining
and -granting functions of the state.
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The working paper will certainly interest common-law lawyers, for
it represents an attempt to stand back from the details of Crown liability
cases that employ and distort common-law concepts. 2 The traditional
contract, tort, trust, restitution, and property concepts that have been
developed in common-law superior courts in the context of disputes
between individuals, bureaucrats, and the state stand to be transformed,
if not replaced, by entitlements and institutions designed specifically to
apply to the individual-state relationship. 'Law reform and the state'
demands that we describe the outlines and philosophy of a comprehensive
theory of state appropriate to its role in Canadian society as we move
into the twenty-first century.
Although the Commission does not describe its project as I do, I
do not think that anyone will disagree with the magnitude of the questions
that we face. To what extent should we retain the concept of Crown
in federal law? Should we replace the concept of Crown with the concept
of state or federal administration? How does one define those terms?
And what ought to be the relationship of the state to individuals? When
and how should individuals receive compensation and protection from
the state and bureaucrats? 3 In particular, when and how should we as
individuals receive compensation when the state or bureaucrats interfere
with what we are, have, need, or deserve? What is the appropriate response
when there has been inadequate delivery of public and private goods
allocated by the state? To what extent should the majority be bound
by its prior decisions, and to what extent should bureaucrats be obligated
to deliver services defined in part by the majority? The Commission
does not directly acknowledge that it plans to look at these questions;
it certainly does not answer them in this working paper. There is little
doubt, however, that an enquiry into the "legal status of the federal
administration" involves precisely those questions and demands answers
to them.

2 Calls for reform in this area began after the First World War and have accelerated since
then. See, for example, H. Laski, "The Responsibility of the State in England" (1919) 32 Harv.
L. Rev. 447; H. Laski, "The Sovereignty of the State" in H. Laski, Studies in the Problem ofSovereignty

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917) 1; E. Borchard, "Government Liability in Tort" (192425) 34 Yale LJ. 1, 129, 229; (1926-27) 36 Yale LJ. 1, 757, 1039; W. Friedmann, Law in a
ChangingSociety, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) c.1 I; P. Craig, "Compensation

in Public Law" (1980) 96 L.Q. Rev. 413 at 434-35; P. Schuck, Suing Government" Citizen Remedies
for Official Wrongs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
3 The law reform process must focus as much on institutional design and competence as
on substantive rules. See A. Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation" (1976)

89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281; N.K. Komesar, "Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy
for Constitutional Analysis" (1984) 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366; O.M. Fiss, "The Social and Political
Foundations of Adjudication" (1982) 6 Law & Hum. Behavior 121. See Palmer v. Nova Scotia
Forest Industries(1983), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 397 at 500.
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The Commission should be commended for this bold excursion into
territory that has remained beyond the intellectual imagination of most
legal academics in Canada.4 During the past decade there have been

several texts,5 as well as innumerable articles, 6 dealing with the state
or the Crown. All of them, with the exception of a study on compensation
in the case of regulatory change, 7 treat the state within the conceptual

framework of private tort, contract, or property law. In a recent article,
Professor J.C. Smith and I attempt to develop a different theory of public

entitlement in individual-state relations. 8 We argue that individuals should
be entitled to benefits that the state has allocated to them, and we develop

a model that can be used to define those benefits. Upon reflection I
am not sure that our views are correct, but to the extent that we
acknowledge that private law doctrine is an inadequate tool to resolve
individual-state conflict, I think we are right.
It is enough to say here that we recognize the impossibility of
accepting that the state should always be treated like a private firm,
or that common law rules should be applied to bureaucrats for whom
the state may or may not be vicariously liable. The state (or community)
has no private analogue, and, in developing legal concepts and a public
policy of the state, we should not carry with us the conceptual baggage
of another era, designed to deal with other problems. The Commission
4 There have been no Canadian books or articles written in English that attempt to describe
a general legal theory of state, and the relationships among individuals, the community, and
bureaucrats. At the same time Quebec has produced a number of significant theoretical offerings
in this area. See Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 89-100.
5 M. Aronson & H. Whitmore, Public Torts and Contracts(Sydney: Law Book Co. Ltd., 1982);
P. Hogg, Liability of the Crown in Australia New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Sydney: Law
Book Co. Ltd., 1971); J.D.B. Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authoritiesr A Comparative Study
(London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1954); G.E. Robinson, PublicAuthoritiesand Legal Liability (London:
University of London Press, 1925); Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Legal Position
of the Crown (Working Paper No. 7) (Vancouver. The Law Reform Commission of B.C., 1972);
C. Harlow, Compensationand Government Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1982).
6 Many of the articles are contained in the bibliography of the Working Paper, supra, note
1 at 89-100. Other significant articles in Canada include A.W. Mewett, "The Quasi-Contractual
Liability of Governments" (1959) 13 U. Toronto LJ. 56; M. Bridge, "Government Liability, the
Tort of Negligence and the House of Lords Decision in Ans v. Merton London Borough Council"
(1978) 24 McGill LJ.277.
7 The article by J. Quinn & M. Trebilcock, "Compensation, Transition Costs, and Regulatory
Change" (1982) 32 U. Toronto LJ. 117, attempts to develop a general theory of compensation
that does not require the injured individual to articulate a claim within the traditional common
law doctrinal categories. See also L. Kaplow, "An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions" (1986)
99 Harv. L Rev. 509.
It should be recognized that many American theorists, in developing ideas about compensation
in cases of state takings, have engaged in similar analyses. See J. Sax, "Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights" (1971) 81 Yale LJ.149; F. Michelman, "Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of'Just Compensation' Law" (1967) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165.
8 D. Cohen & J.C. Smith, "Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in Public
Law" (1986) 64 Can. B. Rev. 1.
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recognizes this in several contexts. In defining the relationship of
individuals and the state the Commission recommends that we recognize
the particular way in which the state exercises unilateral power as well
as the enormous range of benefits and services provided by the modern
state. They recognize that the way in which the state exercises power
demands innovative and enlightened responses.
The Commission's work is, however, as yet incomplete, and this
suggests that the problem of law reform and the state must be approached
carefully in the future. While the work to date is important, it is flawed
for several reasons. First, the methodology of the Commission's work,
focusing on theoretical and abstract analyses of the state, is extremely
circumscribed. Second, the focus of the paper on the 'legalization' of
the relationship between the individual and the state may be shortsighted.
Third, the paper fails to distinguish adequately between concerns with
bureaucracies and concerns with majority tyranny. In this article I describe
and evaluate the more significant ideas involved in the study of law
reform and the state in light of those concerns.
II. DEFINING THE STATE
The question of law reform and the state, as the Commission
conceives it, requires that the interests of the state be balanced with
the interests of the individual. Leaving aside for the moment what we
mean by the state, and why we focus on individual rights and interests,
the balancing metaphor is itself an indication of a failure to articulate
the real issues. The balancing metaphor is the classic paradigm of
twentieth-century legal thought. While it is a comfortable adjunct to a
utilitarian, rationalistic ideology, it reveals little. It assumes an intellectual
process in which a neutral observer, applying a metaphysical measuring
device independent both of her or himself and of what is being weighed,
scientifically determines and calculates the sum ofthe 'weights' of freedom,
dignity, individual privacy, bureaucratic autonomy, class solidarity, majoritarian wishes, efficient program design and implementation - all
of which are somehow measureable on the same scale. The metaphor
distorts the reform process, which must involve articulating and expressing
our views and feelings towards these things, explaining why and how
we value them, and designing a social policy that reflects these values. 9
In undertaking the task of reforming the law of Crown liability
and associated concepts, the Commission briefly describes the chaotic
9 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978) at 26. G.E. White,
The American JudicialTradition" Profiles of Leading American Judges (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1976).
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and confusing historical treatment of the 'Crown' in English and Canadian
law. There is no attempt to order the confusion, and the Commission
acknowledges that the historical inconsistencies and contradictions in
the treatment of the concept of the Crown cannot and need not be
rationalized. Judges, legislators, and writers who use the term do not
choose their words carefully, nor are they always talking about the same
thing. When we use one word to describe the monarch herself, the
institution of regal power, the concept of sovereignty, the constitutional
head of state, judicial institutions and actors, the cabinet, the executive
branch of government, individual ministers, government departments
established under legislation, Crown corporations, and individual civil
servants, it is not surprising that confusion reigns.
What we must do is think about the state, government, or Crown
in a way that recognizes the political reality of Canada at the end of
the twentieth century. That, the Commission suggests, requires two major
shifts in our legal view of the world. First, the concept of Crown should
be relegated to its formal and traditional function as constitutional head
of state.'0 Discarding monarchical terminology and limiting the Crown
to its purely formal role would reduce terminological confusion, historical
biases, and anti-democratic and inegalitarian concepts insofar as they
affect individuals in their relationships with bureaucrats and the majority.
Second, and much more important, individuals who are injured (or are
less well off) as a result of decisions and actions of the majority of
citizens acting through their elected representatives, or the decisions and
actions of individuals or institutions purportedly carrying out the directions
of the majority, should be considered as having direct claims against
the administration. The Commission suggests that we recognize the legal
status of the federal administration, which would replace the archaic
and confusing legal status of the Crown. Thus the central point of law
reform and the state is conceived to be the need for unification of the
federal administration - and the application of a uniform legal system
of rights, privileges, and immunities to it. While the implicit transformation
of Canadian political structure into a somewhat unusual form of republicanism would eliminate three hundred years of confusion as to what
is meant by Crown, it will not remove the need to define what is meant
by administration.
The Commission fails, however, to provide us with a meaningful
or workable definition of administration. The Commission's functional
10 At the same time, anyone who studies law reform and the state can quite easily avoid
examining the privileges and immunities pertaining directly to the person of the monarch, and
the Commission states that it is not concerned with that issue. Working Paper, supra, note 1 at
25-26.
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concept of "a collection of material and human resources existing to
give concrete effect to legislation, manage public services of general
concern, and provide assistance benefits"" is part of the idea. But we
are also talking about the responsibility of bureaucracies and individual
bureaucrats who act selfishly, individuals and institutions who exercise
power under the authority of law but who can be considered independent
of the state, and so on. The suggestion of a functional definition of the
state seems to me to make sense -one can retain the symbolic virtues
of the Crown and its history (if one wants to), while simultaneously
ensuring that a public policy of the state reflects our current values as
to what the majority can and should do to (or for) individuals and
minorities, and what bureaucrats can and should do to (or for) them.
Our decisions can incorporate an instrumental rationale if we want to
restrain the majority and bureaucracies. Current Crown liability rules
can do the same, but are certainly less likely to do so, and do so less
openly.
In defining the relationship between individuals and the community,
must
understand what we mean by the state or the administration,
we
and our appraisal should not be drawn too narrowly. The state (and
it may be prejudging the issue to refer to it as the federal administration)
can be conceived of in the narrowest of terms -

the Crown -

or in

the broadest - all individuals and institutions whose activities and welfare
are a consequence of legal power. The concept can be extended to
individual state employees; individual state contractors; institutions such
as hospitals and educational institutions that receive all or part of their
funding from public sources; corporations established by the state;
corporations owned privately but whose legal existence is the result of
state action; corporations owned, controlled, and influenced by state
employees; individuals able to exercise power as a result of state action;
professional governing bodies; the courts, judges, and prosecutors.
Government departments and institutions exercising specific statutory and
regulatory powers are only the more obvious elements of the state. We
must recognize that power is exercised in an infinite variety of ways
- the exercise of extra-legislative executive power by the cabinet, the
exercise of power by judges and state-employed 'Crown' attorneys, the
exercise of power by individuals and institutions funded from public
resources, or controlled or influenced by elected representatives and
institutions, and the exercise of power by individuals and institutions
who are able to do so only because the state permits them to act collectively
in corporations and to own private property. All of these are examples
I bI at 9.
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of the exercise of power that requires the implicit acceptance, if not
support, of those who control the machinery of government and force.

In this sense, the state is everything, and what we must do is decide
when and how we want to recognize public individuals and institutions
in a different way than we currently recognize private individuals and
institutions. The differences among what we call the Department of
Transportation, what we call Air Canada, and what we call Canadian
Pacific Airlines are differences of degree. None could exercise power,
either externally or internally, without the institutional structure that
permits them to do so. The state is that structure and is part of all social
organization. 2
The functional definition suggested by the Commission is only a
first step in the development of a theory of state - and an uncertain
step at that. The "collection of material and human resources implementing legislation" leaves out an enormous range of individuals and
institutions that can be thought of as the state. The idea that we should
recognize a functional definition of a 'federal administration' is a nice
one, but I think that anyone who seriously engages in law reform in
this context will discover some difficult and provocative paradoxes when
they further develop their ideas about the state.13 Nonetheless, the questions
must be asked, and I agree that the starting point for meaningful answers

12 Thus in one sense the state can be conceived to be the structure of society; it is more
than the formal institutions of legal power, the bureaucracy, or the aggregation of individuals who
are considered part of the community.
We have developed, over the centuries, sophisticated systems of public and private law that
define and regulate the relationship among and between individuals and corporations. The struggle
worked out in that arena forms part of, and is shaped by, that system of law. We do not yet
have a complementary system or law that defines and regulates the relationship of individuals
and the state.
Martin Carnoy argues that "it is the State, rather than production, that should and will be
the principle focus of class struggle." M. Carnoy, The State and Political Theory (Princeton, NJ.:
Princeton University Press, 1984) at 9. What the recent deluge of literature on 'Crown liability',
'litigation and the government', 'government liability', and so on reveals is that legal institutions
and actors will be part of that struggle.
13 One of the most difficult paradoxes is to understand the conceptual, moral, and political
problems involved in determining whether and how present governments should be able to determine
the liability of future governments. The dynamic concept of state, a constant fluid concept (neverending, yet continually changing), suggests that we must rethink our notions of private obligation,
which assume the desirability of permitting our present selves to bind our future selves. As well,
our ideas evolved from corporate ownership and transfers of liability and risk in the case of private
enterprise. It is not clear why future governments, to the extent that they reflect electoral desires,
should necessarily be confronted with irrevocable decisions reached by prior governments reflecting
a different majoritarian consensus.
One can see these ideas reflected in specific common law and statutory rules that require
actual authority and parliamentary appropriation of funds for contractual payments as prerequisites
to legal liability in contract. Attorney-Generalfor Ceylon v. A.D. Silva (1953), [1953] A.C. 461
(P.C.); Dunn v. Macdonald(1897), [1897] 1 Q.B. 555 (C.A.); R v TransworldShipping Ltd (1975),
61 D.L.R. (3d) 304 (F.C.A.); FnancialAdministration Act, RS.C. 1970, c. F-10, ss 25, 33.
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must be a recognition of the modem bureaucratic state.' 4 There is no
reason to retain outmoded, inegalitarian, status-bound concepts of the
Crown and her prerogatives and privileges in designing a theory of state
liability for Canada. That would lead us, as the Law Reform Commission
suggests, to conclude that we should recognize the executive branch of
the state - in effect, recognize a republican form of government at
least in the context of disputes in which individuals seek to obtain financial
compensation from public resources. The historical and perhaps political
necessity of recognizing the Queen as formally superior to democratic
institutions should not interfere with public policy analysis.
III. THE METHODOLOGY OF LAW REFORM
The methodology of law reform at this stage of the Commission's
work is extraordinarily narrow, and the ideas they develop are necessarily
constrained by their perspective and methodology. Discussions with the
Commission's staff suggest that additional research involving case studies
and empirical analysis of compensation practices are currently under
way. Nonetheless, so far the research methodology is characterized by
reliance on legal academic sources and a superficial review of cases
from common-law provinces and Quebec. It specifically rejects historical
analysis - and justifies this decision by a need for "clarification and
15
rationalization" that would be futile if history were to explain the world.
It is clear to some of us that the law consists of inconsistencies and
that denying them is not the path to either understanding or progress.
Moreover, how can one understand the world in a totally abstract,
ahistorical context? The Commission attempts to excise a specific political,
social, and economic institution from the society that gives it meaning,
provides it with resources, and in which it functions and is transformed.
Writers like Atiyah, Friedman, Horwitz, and Danzig, with their insightful
historical studies of legal evolution and of the relationship of economic
history to law, 16 have persuaded many of us that to attempt to study
law in an ahistorical context is to ignore many of the forces that have
shaped the institution and its relationship with the courts.

14 See Recommendation 1 of the Working Paper, supra, note I at 84, and the discussion
at 84-85.
15 Ibid at 6.
16 See P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fallof Freedomof Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979);

L.M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975); M. Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977);
R. Danzig, "Hadley v. Baxendal. A Study in the Industrialization of the Law" (1975) J. Leg. Stud.
249.
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The narrow methodology of law reform is reflected, as well, in the
neglect of the considerable American material drawing on economic
analysis of law,17 and theories of bureaucratic organization, decision
making, and policy implementation18 that might have informed the
Commission's work. American writers, including Reich, Stewart, and Frug,
have written extensively on controlling bureaucratic powers, 9 the development of property rights in government benefits, 20 and the recognition
of private rights in cases of state action 21l precisely the issues presented
in thinking about the legal status of the state. Finally, the examination
or development of case studies in Canada and elsewhere that might inform
us of the reality of state action and of attempts to obtain compensation
from the state has not been conducted.
This narrow methodology and an associated reliance on an impressionistic view of the world is best reflected in the Commission's justification of a specific proposal - to abrogate the historical Crown
immunities and privileges by allusions to concerns with constraining
federal bureaucrats. It speaks of the British model of state liability and
compares it with "the French or German solutions, in which much greater
progress has been made in subjecting the Administration to the law and
judicial control." 22 The Commission does not inform us of the French
or German models of state liability, but even those of us who are familiar
with these continental regimes have no idea of the data upon which
the Commission based its conclusions regarding bureaucratic accountability. A further example of abstraction is the Commission's analysis
of the problems associated with government liability in a federal state.
Here we read about the "theological mystery" of eleven monarchs and
one Queen, and consubstantiation.23 There is no analysis of the practical
17 See M. Spitzer, "An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort" (1977) 50 S. Cal.

L. Rev. 515; L. Blume & D.L. Rubinfeld, "Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis"
(1984) 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569.
18 See G.B. Doern & R.W. Phidd, Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) at 137-

61; H.A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour, 3d ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1976); A. Downs,
Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); P. Sabatier & D. Mazmanian, "The
Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis" (1980) 8 Pol. Stud. J.538; D. Van
Meter & C. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework" (1975)
6 Admin. & Soc. 445; J. Pressman &A. Wildavsky,Implementation (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1973) at 69, 135, 143.
19
1193.
20
1195.
21
22

G.E. Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law" (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev.
R. Stewart & C. Sunstein, "Public Programs and Private Rights" (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev.
C. Reich, "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale LJ.733.
Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 11.

23 Ibid. at 13.
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and political problems created by the existence of eleven democratically
elected and accountable legislatures, eleven bureaucracies, and eleven
electorates attempting to tax one another and to regulate and interfere
with one another's policy objectives and programs. 24 The problems
associated with federalism deserve far more sophisticated analysis. The
Commission makes no reference to ministries of intergovernmental affairs,
federal-provincial conferences of first ministers, or negotiations of
federal-provincial agreements.
The failure of the Commission to undertake any serious case studies
of federal-provincial relations, and its reliance on abstractions such as
"various embodiments of the same sovereign," 25 are not helpful. In the
end, one wonders why a Law Reform Commission should study such
26
a complex institution relying on cases and articles from legal texts.
Law reform that takes this approach is particularly ineffective, at least
in part because of its methodology. Perhaps the case studies and empirical
research currently under way at the Commission will provide a stronger
foundation for future thinking.
IV. DICEY AND THE STATE
The Commission, after arguing for the recognition of the federal
administration, then makes a critical error. Perhaps to pacify entrenched
conservatives, it draws on nineteenth-century Diceyian concepts of the
28
Rule of Law 27 and the twentieth-century Charterof Rights and Freedoms

24 There is, admittedly one brief reference to "political" problems, but no one can argue that
this is analysis. See ibid at 16.
Later in the Working Paper the Commission raises the problem of federal initiatives being
subject to provincial regulatory programs in the context of its analysis of the deficiences of judicial
review. Here, the problem of interprovincial relations is reduced to allusions to interpretive rules.
Again there is no discussion of inter-governmental relations and the consultative processes that
have been developed in this context. Ibid at 55-56. See also ibid at 13-16.
25 Ibid at 13.
26 See Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning (Chair
H.W. Arthurs) (Ottawa: Information Division, Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada,
1983) at 70; H.W. Arthurs, "Paradoxes of Canadian Legal Education" (1973) 3 Dal. Li. 639
at 657. Arthurs suggests that law reform agencies could be seen as doing research on law, which
he defines as research using methodological tools and analytical models derived from non-legal
disciplines that are used to evaluate, understand, and criticize law and legal institutions. The Law
Reform Commission, at least in this working paper, did not fulfill Arthurs' somewhat optimistic
views since virtually all of its research involved studying cases and legal articles and texts.
27 See A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd.,
1959) at 202.
28 Part I of the Constitution Acq 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
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to justify the argument that, on the basis of formal equality, the
administration should be treated like a private firm - at least, the
Commission believes that we should take this as our original position
for the purposes of its argument. Putting aside the ambiguities of the
Rule of Law, or perhaps reflecting those ambiguities, the Commission
later recommends the development of a special legal regime applicable
to the federal administration. If one believes, as Diceyians would, that
the application of particular preferential rules to the administration
somehow violates the Rule of Law, then certainly the creation of a special
system of law and process does so to an even greater degree. I have
no quarrel with the suggestion that the federal administration be subject
to liability rules and processes different from those applied to private
firms, but the justification for such different treatment cannot be a concern
with the Rule of Law.
My quarrel is not, however, with the internal inconsistency and
tautology of using the Rule of Law in this way. Rather, I cannot accept
the Diceyian idea that one should 'legalize' the relationship of individuals
and the state. The Commission's error arises from several sources. One
is the methodology of the analysis, which I have described earlier. The
second is a failure to articulate what Dicey was advocating. The third
is the unwillingness of the Commission to examine critically the underlying
structure of private law.
It is disturbing that in the modem Canadian state so much of law
reform still relies on Dicey and yet fails to discuss what Dicey was
advocating. The only possible explanation for Diceyian arguments is that
the politics of law reform require comfortable models of legal argument.
Anyone familiar with Dicey understands that he was a conservative he believed that majoritarian values expressed in democratic institutions
(which were slowly becoming more democratic during his life) were
dangerous to his concepts of security and rights to property. He was
terrified of bureaucratic power and recognized the unreality of political
accountability as applied to much of the bureaucracy. Finally, he did
not believe in the legitimacy of the state as an institution providing goods
and services directly to the public - the welfare state, whatever its
rationale, could only lead to domination of private interests. These beliefs
led Dicey to design a legal model of the state embodying two central
characteristics. First, he believed that we ought not to recognize the state
as the subject of legal analysis. If the state did not exist in law, it would
be logically impossible to recognize in it a legal obligation to provide
benefits to individuals. Whatever one thinks of the assumptions of law,
the logic of this argument is powerful.
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Second, Dicey believed, and modem advocates of individual rights
confirm, 29 that an effective way to control public bureaucratic power
is to make bureaucrats as individualssubject to the same system of legal
rules as non-bureaucrats. The function ofjudicial review as Dicey designed
it is, at least in part, to frustrate or deny the achievement of the community's
objectives in favour of others. That much is obvious, and it is disappointing
that the working paper could not articulate it. Dicey's conception of
the Rule of Law consisted of several ideas, including one that every
person "whatever be his rank or condition" is subject to ordinary law
and to the ordinary courts. 30 He specifically excluded from consideration
any argument that bureaucrats should be subject to different rules or
different institutions. He spoke of administrative law and administrative
tribunals in France as "utterly unknown to the law of England, and indeed
...fundamentally inconsistent with our traditions and customs." 31 Dicey
recognized the unreality of theoretical Crown powers 32 and argued that
the legal responsibility of bureaucrats, and thus their effective control
by judges and courts, resulted from the refusal of the court to recognize
that any act could be done by the state33 and from the personal legal
liability of individual bureaucrats. 34 The Commission must have been
aware that Dicey was not ignorant of Crown immunities, but rather
constructed a system that he believed would more effectively constrain
bureaucratic conduct and the community than would a droit administrf.35
The point is that Dicey was consumed with 'legality', with the control
of 'collectivist' legislation notwithstanding its source in the majoritarian
values of even a limited democracy, and with the displacement of
bureaucratic values by judicial values. Law reform involving the legal
status of the federal government must speak to the debate between those
who would control the state by regulating its individual components and
those who would recognize the institution of the state and ignore its
real actors. It is far too late to return to Dicey and to ignore recent

29 Recent legislative hearings in the United States have considered amendments to the Federal

Tort Claims Act to provide for the direct liability of the United States government. See H.R. 595,
Federal Tort Claims, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives 98th Cong. April 27-28,
1983. See P. Schuck, supra,note 2 at 82-99.
30 Supra, note 27 at 193. See also ibid at 202-3.

31 Ibid. at 203.
32 Ibid at 9-12.
33 Dicey used the word 'Crown', ibid. at 25.
34 Ibid.

35 Harry Arthurs makes the same error. H.W. Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law: A
Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.. 1.
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work that has examined36 the instrumental impact of liability regimes on
bureaucratic behaviour.
Finally, a critical perspective on law reform and the state demands
that we examine the underlying structure of private law. Legalization
of rights against the state, if that is what law reform involves, will
perpetuate the application of common law values - focusing on
individuals rather than the community, recognizing and giving priority
to property and economic rights, attempting to control both bureaucrats
and the community, refusing to consider legislative history and regulatory
purposes, and, as Dicey put it, implementing policy that differs from
existing ideas in representative legislation. 37 Contract law, 38 tort law, 39
and many of the other analytical tools used by judges have all been
identified with particular ideologies.
It is clear, for example, that applying private law to the state will,
in many cases, mean invoking a model of law that draws its legitimating
function from notions of corrective justice.40 Certainly there may be public
policy objectives other than, or at least in addition to, corrective justice.
Corrective justice, with its orientation to the status quo, will justify
compensation only where a particular person can be seen to have
wrongfully deprived another particular person of certain rights.
Furthermore, models of corrective justice often assume relevant actors
who are equal in all respects. Law reform need not wed itself to either
of these corrective justice ideals, and it seems to me that in deciding
on models of state and law we need not adopt perspectives drawn from
another time and culture.
For all these reasons - the narrow methodology of the Working
Paper, the use of Diceyian arguments, and an acceptance at this stage
of legalization - it is not surprising that we may overlook the central
issue - the design of institutions and processes through which individuals
36 Project, "Suing the Police in Federal Court" (1979) 88 Yale LJ. 781; EJ. Littlejohn, "Civil
Liability and the Police Officer The Need for New Deterrents to Police Misconduct" (1981) 58

U. Det. J. Urb. L. 365 at 428; G.A. Bermann, "Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability"
(1977) 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1175 at 1190-202.

The only explanation for employing Diceyian arguments is that Dicey is familiar to all of
us, and has provided the philosophical foundation for much of the Canadian administrative law
that has been created by judges. Perhaps they thought that Diceyian allusions would be comfortable

to common-law administrative lawyers. In the end, I think that the Diceyian arguments weaken
the proposals, which are sufficiently justifiable in their own right.
37 See A.V. Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd.,
1905).
38 B. Mensch, "Freedom of Contract as Ideology" (1981) 33 Stan. L. Rev. 753; R. Unger,
"The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561.
39 See R. Abel, "A Critique of American Tort Law" (1981) 8 Brit. J. Law & Soc. 199.
40 A vocal proponent of this school is R. Epstein, who develops this theory in "A Theory
of Strict Liability" (1973) 2 J. Leg. Stud. 151.
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will be able to participate effectively in the definition and delivery of
the benefits that they claim. Legalization may shift power to a limited
degree, but the demoralization and alienation in modem western society
is not likely to be overcome simply by allowing the demoralized to sue
the state.
V. CONTROLLING BUREAUCRATS AND CONTROLLING
MAJORITIES
The third source of confusion in this area of the law and in much
of associated law reform is a failure to recognize that studying the
relationship of individuals with the state involves studying two very
different political processes. The first is the definition of the permissible
limits of the exercise of majoritarian power or the exercise of power
by coalitions of minorities at the expense of other minorities. On this
view, implied rights to compensation when legislatures interfere with
private property rights and private wealth should be understood as an
attempt by judges to prevent the majority of us from abusing democratic
power and from acting "unjustly (and perhaps tyranically) toward a
minority." 41 This is a central concern in all democracies, and any study
of the state in Canada must involve establishing a set of criteria as well
as a way of thinking about the intractable problem of democracy and
the tyranny of the majority. There is little doubt that the majority, in
true democracies, can argue that their collective action is founded on
a moral legitimacy to which private firms, individuals, and bureaucrats
cannot appeal.
This brings us to the second process defining the relationship of
individuals to the state - the definition of the permissible limits of
bureaucratic power. Here, we are concerned with the separation of
ownership from control and power, which is characterized by the
development of bureaucracies. The fragmentation of 'ownership' in
democracies, the diffuseness of the interests of the electorate, the
complexity of the operations of the state, and the limited capacity of
individuals to predict the future and act on the basis of their predictions
all lead to bureaucrats who are not accountable to the public. A concern
with regulating bureaucratic conduct in these circumstances has been
the overriding concern of judges in reviewing administrative action, and
this is equally their concern when individuals seek compensation from
the state or individual bureaucrats. But bureaucrats, unlike the majority,
cannot point to their own interests as explanations for their actions and
41 R.A. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1985) at 15.
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as justifying judicial deference. Any law reform process that fails to express
the distinction between these two very dissimilar problems (regulating
bureaucrats and regulating majorities) may represent an anti-democratic
manifesto.
The problems I have described are revealed in the examination by
the Commission of a specific area of state liability - tort liability of
the Crown.42 The alleged purpose of the exercise is to inform us of the
details of a special regime of public law applicable to the federal
administration. The Commission argues that a special regime would
"provide better safeguards for the rights of individuals," but the reason
articulated by the Commission - "providing solutions adopted to their
particular situations" 43 - is entirely unilluminating. The analysis is little
better. The Commission argues that the application of private law to
state activities is "less than adequate," but we are not told why. They
also argue that a more modem system would be simpler. We are not
told, however, how this is just or right or more efficient; we are not
told what the Commission means by a simpler system; and we are not
given any idea as to how we can achieve this simpler, modem system.
The Commission does suggest that direct state liability would be
preferable to vicarious liability - on one view this would "correspond
more closely to the nature of administrative activities." 44 There is certainly
something to be said in favour of designing liability regimes that can
respond effectively to institutional wrongs, but as I explained earlier,
it is not obvious that recognizing the state for tort law purposes will
be a more effective regulatory device than requiring individual bureaucratic responsibility.45
The critical failure is the confusion between the review of distributive
judgments of the state representing majority interests and the review
of bureaucratic power. If the activity or injury is authorized in some
sense, we should at least be concerned with majoritarian values. The
Commission lumps together such ideas as "a failure to perform the
obligations of the department," "the adoption of an illegal decision,"
"the fault of incompetence," and "an error in material operations," without
defining or discussing them.46 A brief critique of one quote should be
enough to illustrate my concerns. The Commission quotes with approval
J. Donzelot, who argues that in many state liability cases an "accident
42 Working Paper, supra,note 1 at 69-74.
43 ]bid

44 Ibid at 70-71.
45 See HJ.Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance is not Treated as a Crime to Make 'Profits' a Dirty Word" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall U. 393.
46 Working Paper, supra,note I at 70, 71.
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is usually ... the result of the entire work process ...[and] ...those
involved are thereby concerned ...in compensating for the resulting
injury." 47 There is no analysis of the loss-shifting and loss-spreading

abilities of the state. To say that the bureaucratic institution is liable
to compensate for losses is facile, and certainly the Commission does
not believe that the individual bureaucrats should be liable. The Commission, when it goes on to suggest that "sheer negligence" may justify
personal liability,48 makes no attempt or perhaps is unaware of the
enormous conceptual, political, and economic complexities in determing
bureaucratic negligence.
The Commission apparently ignores the fact that we are also
regulating bureaucrats; simply because a bureaucrat is employed by a
state institution does not necessarily mean that public resources should
be used to compensate individuals whom she or he injures. Liability
rules may have very little impact on bureaucracies, and the Commission
ignores the considerable literature on bureaucratic deterrence. 49 More
significantly, it seems to me that we cannot provide compensation when
a department is not doing what it ought to do without a thoughtful analysis
of what we mean by 'ought to do' - obtuse references to 'objective'
weighing with reference to the normal operations of the department 50
are not particularly insightful. If 'normal' operations involve noncompliance with external or internal standards, will compensation be
denied? What if the 'normal' operations are lawful? Will lawfulness
automatically insulate the state from liability? What if the losses are
due to a Duplessis-like rogue bureaucrat? Dussault is quoted by the
Commission in support for the proposition that compensation should be
payable for "wrongful and damaging acts by the government."51 We
do not know, however, what that means unless we have some understanding what we mean by "wrongful," and "government," and "damaging." Is the non-receipt of state benefits damage? The answer so far
has been no.
The Commission argues that 'logically' the imposition of direct
liability in 1953 in limited circumstances should culminate in recognizing
the direct liability of the administration alone. What is 'logical' about
this? The 1953 Crown Liability Act52 retainedthe personal responsibility
47 Ibid at 71, quoting J. Donzelot, L'invention du social(Paris: Fayard, 1984) at 131.
48 Working Paper, ibid at 71.
49 See supra, note 36.
50 Working Paper, supra, note I at 71.
51 Ibid. at 71 n.119.

52 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38.
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of bureaucrats. Moreover, law is not only logical, it is functional and
normative. If the imposition of direct liability in 1953 failed to establish
a more effective regulatory or compensatory tool, or if the 1953 Act
does not reflect modem ideas about the relationship between individuals
and the community, it would be illogical to extend its conceptual
framework on a more general basis.
The Commission alludes briefly to insurance-based compensation
plans that may be appropriate in the state liability context, but again
there is no indication that any serious thought has gone into the idea.
They argue that no-fault insurance regimes would be more efficient and
less onerous as they would require only a "direct link of cause and effect
[to be] established between the damage and the activity."53 Even leaving
aside questions of allocative efficiency, it is not clear to me that causation
is as simple as that statement supposes it to be. What ought to be the
result if a corporation locates an economic enterprise close to a stateowned nuclear power plant and subsequently suffers either economic
losses when the nuclear power plant requires extensive periodic planned
maintenance or property damage when the plant experiences a foreseeable
radiation leak? Should compensation be payable? Who 'caused' the
economic loss? Has the firm 'caused' the injury to itself? Has the state
'caused' the economic loss if the firm was compensated ex ante through
a reduction in its capital investment? In one sense, the reduction in wealth
is due to the confluence of two activities that reduces the actual or expected
benefits available to either alone. The simplistic causation language
conceals and distorts the analysis, which may depend upon an initial
determination of rights or economic efficiency.
Nor does the Commission appear to be aware of any of the other
issues associated with compensation programs. What are the administrative costs of no-fault liability regimes as compared to other compensation plans? Where is the analysis of moral hazard and the effect
of insurance on victim and co-injurer behaviour? Should the source of
the insurance payments be general revenues, or specific user fees? Should
compensation be payable simply because the state exists, and because
individuals need or deserve or have earned a particular level of wealth?
Why should the state provide individuals with insurance for risks when
private insurance is available? What are the 'social' risks that would
be subject to this public compensation scheme? One could not have
expected answers to these questions, but surely they ought to have been
acknowledged.

53 Working Paper, supra, note I at 53.
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Most important, the distinction between concerns with controlling
bureaucracies and concerns with controlling majorities is ignored.
Representative institutions undertaking deliberate redistributive programs
resulting in welfare losses to some are discussed in the same breath
as random, unplanned damage associated with state action. The majority,
in some sense representing all of us in a democratic state, may decide
to take wealth from some of us to benefit others. Of course that deprivation
may not be just, and perhaps ought to be unlawful and compensable,
but justice in such cases cannot be determined through an inquiry into
the regulation of bureaucracies. In cases of majority action we are trying,
as Robert Dahl put it, to develop ideas that will permit us to distinguish
injustice or tyranny from the right use of the democratic process.5 4 Unless
we do so, we cannot know when losses associated with state action that
redistributes benefits should be compensated. There is, of course, an
extensive literature on this question - some policy analysts argue that
because there is no net social loss in the case of transfer payments
compensation is unnecessary.55 Others suggest that the state, when it
acts so as to reduce the market value of one person's wealth, is simply
expressing demand that for one reason or another was not expressed
in the market.56 Changes in taste expressed in the market do not give
rise to compensable losses, so why should changes in taste expressed
in the political process be treated differently? The Commission ignores
all these questions, simply stating that "there is also a measure of social
justice in not requiring the victim to bear the burden of an anonymous
7
accident."5
The Commission in a sense misses the point entirely. It is not enough
to declare social justice, one must think about it. The Commission suggests
that in Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen,5 8 a case involving compensation for expropriation of property, the courts in providing compensation on a 'no-fault' basis "are tending to look at the problem of

54 Dahl, supra, note 41.

55 W. Bishop, "Economic Loss in Tort" (1981) 2 Oxford J.Leg. Stud. 1. Compare MJ. Rizzo,
"The Economic Loss Problem: A Comment on Bishop" (1981) 2 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 197.
56 j.Knetsch, PropertyRights and Compensation (Scarborough: Butterworth, 1983) at 11-12.
57 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 73.
58 (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101; see also Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hote Ltd
(1920), [19201 A.C. 508 (H.L.).
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the Government's tortious liability in a new light." 59 Nonsense. It is an
old light, a reflection of judicial values protecting property and economic
interests, and an abhorrence of collectivist legislation. If we think that
firms ought to be compensated in these cases we must think, as the
Commission clearly has not, about democracy, majoritarian tyranny,
utilitarianism, and rights to property.
VI. THE LAW OF THE 'FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION'
The Commission, notwithstanding its previous reliance on Dicey
in proposing that the administration be subject to the ordinary law,60
later calls for a radically anti-Diceyianreform. In effect, the Commission
proposes an administrative law with a "distinctive meaning." 61 This is
the first we see of the implicit concept of a 'droit administratif, and
one can presume that this administrative law is not to be administered
in a judicial 'spirit', as Dicey would have it.62 We are not, however,
told precisely what this distinctive meaning is, although the Commission
does refer to the existing legal regime as one that "primarily benefits
the administration"63 - a conclusion that would shock most administrative
lawyers. One has the sense that the Commission favours the development
of a vaguely defined independent system of law applicable to a unitary
federal administration. It considers the retarded and incoherent development of public law concepts to be unrealistic in view of the growth
of executive power during the postwar era. To be fair, the Commission
does not, at this stage of its work, go so far as to advocate a separate
system of administrative courts, but that is the overriding impression
one has of its ultimate objectives.
The second chapter of the working paper is devoted to developing
those ideas - the Commission admits that while it believes change to
be necessary, it does not know precisely where to go, and again the
analysis is not persuasive. The task of law reform, as of any public policy
analysis, must begin with a relatively detailed factual description of the
59 Working Paper, supra, note I at 73. The Working Paper concludes with a suggestion that
the determination of compensation in disputes between the individual and the state should not

be limited to 'curial' institutions. Brief mention is made of non-adversarial dispute resolution
techniques, settlement and mediation processes, and the like. It is, however, somewhat surprising
that there is no discussion at this point of relatively more interventionist institutions like ombudspersons
and police commissions. And it is startling that the Working Paper fails to consider the central
issue - the accountability of the new curial or non-curial institutions. The review institution may
constitute another arm of the state with an independent ability to injure and deny benefits.
60 bid at 23.
61 Ibid at 26. These ideas are developed more fully at 34-59.
62 Dicey, supra,note 27 at 30ff.
63 Working Paper, supra,note I at 27.
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phenomenon one is studying. Here, the Commission provides us with
an intellectual construct, but there are no case studies, no descriptions
of bureaucratic activities and processes, and no analysis of the impact
of current or proposed liability regimes. As well, one must identify the
normative assumptions that underlie the analysis. Apparently, the Comshould
mission believes that the status of the federal administration
64
state.
the
to
relation
in
individuals
of
enhance the position
The ensuing discussion of the conditions favouring individual rights
fails to clarify those ideas. We are told that "the question of the rights
of individuals has now become a central concern of administrative law." 65
There is, surprisingly, no acknowledgment that most of what we call
administrative law, with its focus since the turn of the century on judicial
review, has been devoted to controlling the exercise of majoritarian and
bureaucratic power in favour of protecting the "rights of individuals."
While some of us may now be questioning whether the judicial defence
of some rights and the denial of others is correct, the conflict is an ancient
one. It may be, as we move towards the twenty-first century, that we
should discard our bias in favour of individual rights - or at least include
in the concept of rights more than traditional ideas of contract and property.
The Commission apparently believes that we should recognize the
need for an arm of the state to act efficiently and to appreciate the
"different logic" that justifies the executive branch of the state. 66 Yet
the discussion is so abstract as to be virtually meaningless. The idea
that the executive branch has specialized functions that differentiate it
from the legislative branch is trite. What is required in law reform is
an analysis of the ways in which this specialized function operates in
reality - policing, delivery of health care, provision of public goods
such as parks, national defence and mass immunization programs,
establishment of educational institutions, redistribution of wealth and
taxation, rate regulation, licensing, and so on.
As well, in designing a regime of public law it may be dangerous
to adopt the Commission's implicit views that the bureaucracy is a benign
entity simply fulfilling the wishes of its political or command masters.
Other views are quite different. In these an activist, independent bureaucracy shapes state policy, and then actively implements that policy
to achieve bureaucratically defined objects. 67 The legitimacy of executive
64 Ibid at 43-59.
65 Ibid at 34.
66 Ibid at 60.

67 See, for example, R.D. Cairns, Rationalesfor Regulation (Technical Report No. 2) (Ottawa:
Economic Council of Canada, 1980) at 14-19.
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action in this latter model is quite different from that which can be
articulated in the case of passive bureaucracies.
Current law reform analysis, the Law Reform Commission's work
being no exception, is apt to turn to the "paramountcy of liberal concepts"6 8
for an ideology that favours the rights of individuals and that should
drive our conclusions regarding the design of individual-state relations.
The Charter of Rights is seen as a reflection of liberal, individualistic
concepts of freedom of speech and associated political rights, and rights
to life, liberty, and security of the person. This focus on controlling state
power in favour of individual rights should, according to the Commission,
be reflected in our thinking about the legal status of the federal
administration. While that proposition would seem straightforward, I have
two reservations with such law reform. First, abstract legal theorizing
too often fails to appreciate the intensely political nature of the debate
that led to the recognition of individual liberties in the Charter. For
example, the 'curious' omission of property rights in the Charter is
explained as a reflection of a philosophy that identifies the individual
as the supreme value. Philosophy aside, it seems that historical analysis
leads to the conclusion that property rights were excluded as a result
of the federal government's perceived need for the support of the
governments of several provinces, which were concerned with federal
encroachment on provincial legislativejurisdiction over property matters, 69
and not as a result of a particular view of the worth of individuals.
Second, it is not clear to me that law reform should necessarily
be concerned with the 'legalization' of the relationship of individuals
and the state. As I argued earlier, the distribution of collective goods,
economic regulation, and policing all require a view of the community
as a vehicle for expressing communal values, 70 and perhaps for protecting
classes and individuals who are not able for one reason or another to
use existing legal and political processes. Legalizing rights that are defined
through well-developed democratic political processes is not necessarily
a solution, nor is legalizing rights that have not been so defined. I have
no quarrel with the thesis that we should be concerned about the welfare

68 Working Paper, supra,note I at 42.
69 See R. Romanow, J. White & H. Leeson, Canada... Notwithstanding (Toronto: Carswell,
1983) at 77; A.C. Cairns, "The Politics of Constitutional Renewal in Canada" in KG. Banting
& R. Simeon, eds., Redesigning the State: The Politics of ConstitutionalChange (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1985) at 121-27.
70 Any theory of state liability must do more than protect private rights from state action.
The state as the defendant should not be assimilated to the position of private enterprise - at
the very least we can begin to understand state action as a reflection of communual values rather

than private rights.
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of individuals, but I have grave reservations about the prescription for
alleviating the disease.
Nonetheless, it is possible to draw on the Charter's equality rights
provisions to justify a more general concern with individual welfare, and
in this context the Commission argues that the recognition of equality
rights reinforces restrictions on autonomous state action. After an extended
discussion of equality rights,71 the Commission concludes that "Dicey
clearly meant that.., individuals and the administration should be subject
to the same rules contained in the law." 72 I do not agree. Dicey first
argued that we should not recognize the administration; and second, that
individual bureaucrats who acted unlawfully should be treated like
individuals. He further argued that determinations of unlawfulness should
be made by judges whose values and attitudes would be opposed in
many cases to those of the administration. 73 Dicey may have been right
in his implicit assumption that if we want to control institutions we should
in some instances ignore the institution, and focus our attention on the
individuals who participate in and constitute the organization. Economic
sanctions and stigmatization are effective regulatory tools only if the
actors react to them.
In any event, after suggesting that individuals and the administration
should be subject to the same rules, the Commission makes perhaps its
most significant proposal - that the administration and the individual
should not be subject to equality of treatment. Why? Because the
administration is different! 74 Some would argue that the dialogue created
by Rule of Law analysis is necessary. Here the dialogue results in a
tautological conclusion that equality means equal treatment of equals.
Law reform submits a conclusory statement that the state is different,
thus justifying a special regime of law in light of those differences. We
are left to wonder, for the time being, precisely what is so 'special' about
the state that would justify those conclusions.
VII. THE STATE IN MODERN CANADIAN SOCIETY
In the end, the enterprise of law reform, an inquiry into state liability,
and the definition of individual rights against the state must all address
and answer the most difficult question - why should we recognize the
state as an institution independent from its constituent actors? The answer
is that the state, represented by those individuals who claim to exercise
71 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 45-48.
72 Ibid at 48.
73 See Arthurs, supra, note 35 at 7-14.
74 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 59-60.
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monopolistic legitimate force and who redistribute benefits from the
taxation of private funds, has no private analogies. If we are truly concerned
with the control of bureaucratic power the inadequate delivery of public
benefits, it is impossible to believe that our concerns will be ameliorated
if we continue to ignore the state. The Law Reform Commission
acknowledges as much in the final section of the working paper, which
contains the Commission's most important and provocative ideas.
The Commission argues that the vulnerability of the individual in
her or his relationship with the state justifies the creation of a special
legal regime defining and regulating bureaucratic power. The Commission
observes that the individual "is in a position of dependence and vulnerability,"75 and is isolated, powerless, and marginalized in a technical,
scientifically-managed, -organized, and -controlled society. The traditional authoritarian concept of sovereign immunity, with its associated
ideas of subjugation and submission, reinforces the isolation of the
individual. These ideas suggest that a concern with enhancing human
dignity leads to a model of state liability that would restrict executive
authority and insure the delivery of public benefits.
While this idea is attractive, it deserves to be thought about further.
First, law reform is misdirected if it does not appreciate the dual nature
of state benefits. In some cases the state is providing the infrastructure
for capitalist enterprise - rights to property and contract, rights to organize
collectively, protection from certain competitive activities, institutions
providing information, communications, transportation, and riskspreading services, and associated private and public goods. In other
cases, the state is providing individuals with personal benefits - unemployment benefits, housing, and health care - reflecting the welfare
philosophies of the redistributive state and perhaps necessary if the state
is to remain legitimate. The latter, and not the former, may be associated
with demoralization, domination, surveillance, and dependence. Corporate
benefits are certainly not, and if a concern with the imbalance of power
and the dignity of individuals justifies reforms to adjust the relative power
of individuals and the bureaucracy, indiscriminate application of the
concept will only exacerbate existing inequalities between the two groups.
Second, law reform must analyze the vulnerability, dependence, and
demoralization that the Commission alleges are associated with state
action. It may be that these social and personal phenomena are the result
of the state, rather than the community or other individuals, providing
the benefits. They are not necessarily associated with the state depriving
individuals of entitlements or redefining the benefits. The lack of social
75 Ibid at 53.
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solidarity, the isolation of the individual from the community, and the
disconnection between benefit and dessert may be the source of the

discontent. If that is so, then the demoralization will not necessarily be
reduced or eliminated by creating legal entitlements to those benefits.
It may be true that the dependency and demoralization reflect particular
bureaucratic insensitivities and capriciousness, but even then it is not
at all certain that legalization is an effective bureaucratic regulatory
technique.
Third, law reform must address the way in which individuals do
or can participate in the legislative and regulatory definition of these
benefits. It seems to me that one way to reduce demoralization and
dependency is to establish an institutional framework that will allow
individuals and the community to participate effectively in the definition
and delivery of the benefits. The Commission does not address this point
and yet we cannot know what these benefits are unless we analyze the
means used to distribute them. The demoralization that the Commission
alleges is a feature of modem society may be as much the product of
the attitudes of the bureaucrats and community that provide the benefits,
the attitudes of private citizens who believe themselves to be independent
of the state, the stigma that is (perhaps deliberately) associated with
the receipt of state largesse, and the techniques of distribution that include
surveillance, invasions of privacy, and restrictions on liberty. The legalization of these benefits, while it may shift the balance of power to some
limited degree, is at the same time too blunt and too specific a tool.
Fourth, law reform that is concerned with the non-receipt of public
goods cannot be premised on a belief that all state benefits are equally
deserved. Some of us may have other theories of distributive justice,
but even if we did not, it is naive to ignore that at least some distributed
public benefits are the result of political affiliation, bureaucratic selfaggrandizement, or worse. Simply because public resources are used to
benefit others does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a collective
decision to benefit the recipients has been made - it may simply represent
a case of one group of individuals (bureaucrats) giving away wealth,
originally owned or created by a second group, to a third group. Rather
than giving this third group legal power to demand the benefit or
compensation for its loss, perhaps we should continue to develop a public

policy that ensures bureaucratic financial accountability.
In the end, one should not depend solely on abstract concepts if
one is truly concerned with the solution or amelioration of real social
problems. The creation of legal rights against the state may shift power,
but then only in marginal cases. We may lose sight of the real questions
that deal with the quality of social benefits received by individuals and
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the process of definition and distribution if we restrict our vision to the
formal establishment of legal rights.
Finally, the traditional response to concerns with state power has
beenjudicial review, and as is to be expected, the Law Reform Commission
focuses on the deficiences of this remedial process. I suppose that the
Commission is arguing that we ought to think about a comprehensive
restatement of individual rights in relation to the state since traditional
methods of judicial review are inadequate to achieve the Commission's
as yet unarticulated objectives. But it can be argued that, if we want
to deny rights where their acknowledgment would necessitate redistribution of wealth, the current process of judicial review is just what one
would expect. The Commission apparently fails to understand both the
values and process associated with common law judging. Anyone familiar
with the literature on judicial values and reasoning could not believe
that "judges have simply recognized the existence and scope of a
privilege." 76 Recognition and definition are active processes, and common

law judges have for decades attempted to restrict the operations of the
state and of individual state representatives. In some cases the judges
are attempting to control majorities; in others, they are concerned with
bureaucratic power, but in all cases they will protect judicially defined
and created property and economic rights. Implied rights to compensation
on the expropriation of property rights 77 are simply the most obvious
manifestation of judicial values. To argue that common law judges favour
the state and bureaucrats in the context of defining their relationship
with individuals is unsupportable.
The Commission recognizes that judicial review reflects judicial
attitudes and values but concludes that the values reflect deference to
the state. What they should be saying -what is more accurate - is that
judges are protecting the wrong kinds of interests. Traditionally, a concern
with protecting individual private property and economic rights has led
judges to restrict the state when it attempts to interfere with the limited
classes of private entitlements that judges have considered worthy of
protection. Simultaneously, judicial concerns with 'rugged individualism',
independence, and self-reliance make it difficult for recipients of state
benefits to persuade judges that those benefits (which are needed but
perhaps, according to judicial ideologies, not deserved) are similarly
worthy of protection. Thus judges do defer to the state but only when
it or individual bureaucrats interfere with the enjoyment of state largesse
- only where recognition of private rights would be to countenance
wealth redistribution. Certainly one can say that the judges are wrong
in protecting one type of entitlement (property rights and economic
76 Ibid at 55.
77 See Tener v. Queen in Right of British Columbia (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
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expectations) against state action, while refusing to recognize the other,
but that is a very different problem inherent in judicial review.
Nonetheless, the Commission identifies the central idea in this context.
The state exercises a benefit-granting function that has no private
analogue. Tort, property, and contract ideas simply do not provide a
conceptual apparatus that permits us to develop a public policy dealing
with the delivery of state benefits. Contract law concepts are rigid, demand
a specific exchange relationship or perhaps actual reliance, and reflect
theories of promise and consent - none of which reflect the reality
of the relationship of the state to the individuals to whom it is delivering
public services. Tort law concepts, admittedly more flexible, might have
been employed to achieve novel outcomes, but judges have not yet
indicated that they understand the problems associated with the state
delivery of benefits. As well, tort law, in light of its narrow focus on
corrective justice and its unwillingness to accept that the non-receipt
of expected benefits should be recognized as a wrong, is an unwieldy
remedial tool. Similar arguments can be made about trusts, property,
restitution, or any other of the familiar categories of common law thought.
In all cases we protect existing common law entitlements, but do not
recognize collectively defined entitlements with all of the redistribution
that recognition would entail. In the end, I suspect that the Commission
is right in thinking that a special regime of public law is necessary;
but I have serious doubts that their research methodology, analytical
framework, and understanding of the judicial and administrative processes
will assist them in going any further.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Commission concludes that the recognition of new safeguards
protecting the individual "would be eventually associated with the
abandonment of the idea of the Crown as an operative concept in
administrative law. If that idea were to disappear in the course of unifying
the law applicable to the federal Administration, there is no doubt that
entirely new systems could be created."78 It is not clear to me that the
views of the Commission are fully developed - their approach is narrow,
and the reasoning in the working paper is so abstract as to be meaningless.
Nonetheless, there is considerable merit in an attempt to engender debate
and discussion on the topic among the Canadian community. One of
the most difficult and politically contentious projects of law reform is
the reviewing of bureaucratic and majoritarian judgments and the design
of new institutions and processes that recognize the modem Canadian
state.
78 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 79.

